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Gale and Shapley (1962) have proposed the simple two-sided matching model, known as
the marriage problem, in which matchings are one-to-one. There are two disjoint sets of
agents, men and women, and the problem is to match agents from one side of the market
with agents from the other side where each agent has the possibility of remaining single.
They have shown that the set of corewise stable matchings is nonempty. A matching is
corewise stable if there is no subset of agents who by forming all their partnerships only
among themselves (and having the possibility of becoming single), can all obtain a strictly
preferred set of partners.1 Recently, Ehlers (2007) has characterized the von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable sets (hereafter, vNM stable sets) in one-to-one matching problems.
A set of matchings is a vNM stable set if this set satis￿es two robustness conditions:
(internal stability) no matching inside the set is dominated by a matching belonging to
the set; (external stability) any matching outside the set is dominated by some matching
belonging to the set. Ehlers has shown that the set of corewise stable matchings is a subset
of any vNM stable sets.
The notions of corewise stability and of vNM stable set are myopic notions since the
agents cannot be farsighted in the sense that individual and coalitional deviations cannot
be countered by subsequent deviations. A ￿rst contribution that re￿ ects the idea that
agents are not myopic is the concept of weak stability due to Klijn and Mass￿ (2003).
An individually rational matching is weakly stable if for every blocking pair one of the
members can ￿nd a more attractive partner with whom she/he forms another blocking
pair for the original matching. Another interesting contribution is Diamantoudi and Xue
(2003) who have investigated farsighted stability in hedonic games (of which one-to-one
matching problems are a special case) by introducing the notion of the coalitional largest
farsighted conservative stable set which coincides with the largest consistent set due to
Chwe (1994).2 The largest consistent set is based on the indirect dominance relation which
captures the fact that farsighted agents consider the end matching that their move(s) may
lead to. Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) have shown that in hedonic games with strict
preferences core partitions are always contained in the largest consistent set.
In this paper, we adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets
(hereafter, vNM farsightedly stable sets) to predict which matchings are possibly stable
when agents are farsighted. This concept is due to Chwe (1994) who has introduced the
1We refer to Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a comprehensive overview on two-sided matching problems
(marriage problems and college admissions or hospital-intern problems).
2Other approaches to farsightedness in coalition formation are suggested by the work of Xue (1998), or
Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2004).
1notion of indirect dominance into the standard de￿nition of vNM stable sets. Thus, a set
of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if no matching inside the set is indirectly
dominated by a matching belonging to the set (internal stability), and any matching
outside the set is indirectly dominated by some matching belonging to the set (external
stability).
Our main result is the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets in one-to-one
matching problems. A set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is
a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the vNM
(myopically) stable sets, vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are
not corewise stable ones. In other words, we provide an alternative characterization of the
core in one-to-one matching problems. Finally, we show that our main result is robust to
many-to-one matching problems with responsive preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM
farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a setwise stable
matching.
With respect to other farsighted concepts, we show that matchings that do not belong
to any vNM farsightedly stable sets (hence, that are not corewise stable matchings) may
belong to the largest consistent set. We also provide an example showing that there is no
relationship between vNM farsightedly stable sets and the set of weakly stable matchings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces one-to-one matching problems
and standard notions of stability. Section 3 de￿nes vNM farsightedly stable sets. Section
4 provides the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets in one-to-one matching
problems. Section 5 deals with many-to-one matching problems. Section 6 concludes.
2 One-to-one matching problems
A one-to-one matching problem consists of a set of N agents divided into a set of men,
M = fm1;:::;mrg, and a set of women, W = fw1;:::;wsg, where possibly r 6= s. We
sometimes denote a generic agent by i and a generic man and a generic woman by m and
w, respectively. Each agent has a complete and transitive preference ordering over the
agents on the other side of the market and the prospect of being alone. Preferences are
assumed to be strict. Let P be a preference pro￿le specifying for each man m 2 M a
strict preference ordering over W [ fmg and for each woman w 2 W a strict preference
ordering over M [fwg: P = fP(m1);:::;P(mr);P(w1);:::;P(ws)g, where P(i) is agent i￿ s
strict preference ordering over the agents on the other side of the market and himself (or
herself). For instance, P(w) = m4;m1;w;m2;m3;::;mr indicates that woman w prefers
m4 to m1 and she prefers to remain single rather than to marry anyone else. We write
m ￿w m0 if woman w strictly prefers m to m0, m ￿w m0 if w is indi⁄erent between m and
2m0, and m ￿w m0 if m ￿w m0 or m ￿w m0. Similarly, we write w ￿m w0, w ￿m w0, and
w ￿m w0. A one-to-one matching market is simply a triple (M;W;P).
A matching is a function ￿ : N ! N satisfying the following properties: (i) 8m 2 M,
￿(m) 2 W [fmg; (ii) 8w 2 W, ￿(w) 2 M [fwg; and (iii) 8i 2 N, ￿(￿(i)) = i. We denote
by M the set of all matchings. Given matching ￿, an agent i is said to be unmatched or
single if ￿(i) = i. A matching ￿ is individually rational if each agent is acceptable to his
or her mate, i.e. ￿(i) ￿i i for all i 2 N. For a given matching ￿, a pair fm;wg is said
to form a blocking pair if they are not matched to one another but prefer one another
to their mates at ￿, i.e. w ￿m ￿(m) and m ￿w ￿(w). We shall often abuse notation
by omitting the brackets to denote a set with a unique element; here we write ￿(i) = j
instead of ￿(i) = fjg. A coalition S is a subset of the set of agents N.3
De￿nition 1 (corewise enforceability) Given a matching ￿, a coalition S ￿ N is
said to be able to enforce a matching ￿0 over ￿ if the following condition holds: 8i 2 S, if
￿0(i) 6= ￿(i), then ￿0(i) 2 S.
Notice that the concept of enforceability is independent of preferences.
De￿nition 2 A matching ￿ is directly dominated by ￿0, or ￿ < ￿0, if there exists a
coalition S ￿ N of agents such that ￿0 ￿ ￿ 8i 2 S and S can enforce ￿0 over ￿.
De￿nition 2 gives us the de￿nition of direct dominance. The direct dominance rela-
tion is denoted by <. A matching ￿ is corewise stable if there is no subset of agents
who by forming all their partnerships only among themselves, possibly dissolving some
partnerships of ￿, can all obtain a strictly preferred set of partners. Formally, a matching
￿ is corewise stable if ￿ is not directly dominated by any other matching ￿0 2 M.4 Let
C(<) denote the set of corewise stable matchings. Gale and Shapley (1962) have proved
that the set of corewise stable matchings is non-empty. Sotomayor (1996) has provided a
non-constructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages.5
Another concept used to study one-to-one matching problems is the vNM stable set
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953), a set-valued concept, that imposes both internal
and external stability. A set of matchings is a vNM stable set if (internal stability) no
3Throughout the paper we use the notation ￿ for weak inclusion and   for strict inclusion.
4Setting jSj ￿ 2 in the de￿nition of corewise stability, we obtain Gale and Shapley￿ s (1962) concept of
pairwise stability that is equivalent to corewise stability in one-to-one matchings with strict preferences.
5Roth and Vande Vate (1990) have demonstrated that, starting from an arbitrary matching, the process
of allowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to match will converge to a corewise stable matching with
probability one in the marriage problem. In relation, Jackson and Watts (2002) have shown that if
preferences are strict, then the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of corewise
stable matchings.
3matching inside the set is directly dominated by a matching belonging to the set, and
(external stability) any matching outside the set is directly dominated by some matching
belonging to the set.
De￿nition 3 A set of matchings V ￿ M is a vNM stable set if
(i) For all ￿, ￿0 2 V , ￿ ￿ ￿0;
(ii) For all ￿0 2 MnV there exists ￿ 2 V such that ￿ > ￿0.
De￿nition 3 gives us the de￿nition of a vNM stable set V (<). Let V(<) be the set of
all vNM stable sets. Ehlers (2007) has studied the properties of the vNM stable sets in
one-to-one matching problems. He has shown that the set of corewise stable matchings is
a subset of vNM stable sets. Example 1 illustrates his main result.
Example 1 (Ehlers, 2005) Let M = fm1;m2;m3g and W = fw1;w2;w3g. Let P be
such that:
P(m1) P(m2) P(m3) P(w1) P(w2) P(w3)
w1 w2 w3 m2 m3 m1
w2 w3 w1 m3 m1 m2
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3


















It can be shown that the set of corewise stable matchings is C = f￿0g and V = f￿;￿0;￿00g
is the unique vNM stable set.￿
In Example 1 the matchings ￿ and ￿00 belong to the unique vNM stable set because
￿0 does not directly dominate neither ￿ nor ￿00 even though ￿ and ￿00 are not individually
rational matchings (either all women or all men prefer to become single). However, far-
sighted women may decide ￿rst to become single in the expectation that further marriages
will be formed leading to ￿0. The women prefer ￿0 to ￿ and once everybody is divorced,
men and women prefer ￿0 to the situation where everybody is single. A similar reasoning
can be made for ￿00 with the roles of men and women reversed. Then, we may say that (i)
￿0 farsightedly dominates ￿, (ii) ￿0 farsightedly dominates ￿00, and (iii) V = f￿;￿0;￿00g is
not a reasonable candidate for being a vNM farsightedly stable set.
4The concept of weak stability due to Klijn and Mass￿ (2003) is a ￿rst interesting
attempt to re￿ ect the idea that agents are not myopic. A matching ￿ is weakly stable if
for all ￿0 such that ￿0 > ￿ with ￿0 being enforced over ￿ by S, there exists ￿00 such that
￿00 > ￿ with ￿00 being enforced over ￿ by coalition T such that:
(i) TnS 6= ?, SnT 6= ?, and T \ S 6= ?;
(ii) ￿00(i) ￿i ￿0(i) for some i 2 T \ S.
Since any corewise stable matching is a weakly stable matching, the set of weakly stable
matchings is non-empty.6 A matching ￿ is said to be weakly e¢ cient if there is no other
matching ￿0 such that ￿0(i) ￿i ￿(i) for all i 2 N. Klijn and Mass￿ (2003) have shown
that any corewise stable matching is weakly e¢ cient. However, there are weakly stable
matchings that are not weakly e¢ cient as shown in Example 2.
Following Zhou (1994), Klijn and Mass￿ (2003) have de￿ned the notion of bargaining
set for one-to-one matching problems as follows. An objection against a matching ￿ is
a pair (S;￿0) where ￿0 is a matching that can be enforced over ￿ by S and such that
￿0(i) ￿i ￿(i) for all i 2 S. A counterobjection against an objection (S;￿0) is a pair (T;￿00)
where ￿00 is a matching that can be enforced over ￿ by T such that:
(i) TnS 6= ?, SnT 6= ?, and T \ S 6= ?;
(ii) ￿00(i) ￿i ￿(i) for all i 2 TnS and ￿00(i) ￿i ￿0(i) for all i 2 T \ S.
An objection (S;￿0) against a matching is justi￿ed if there is no counterobjection against
(S;￿0). The bargaining set is the set of matchings that have no justi￿ed objections. The
set of corewise stable matchings is a subset of the bargaining set. Klijn and Mass￿ (2003)
have shown that the bargaining set in one-to-one matching markets coincides with the set
of matchings that are both weakly stable and weakly e¢ cient.
Example 2 (Klijn and Mass￿, 2003) Let M = fm1;m2;m3g and W = fw1;w2;w3g.
Let P be such that:
P(m1) P(m2) P(m3) P(w1) P(w2) P(w3)
w3 w1 w2 m3 m1 m2
w2 w3 w1 m2 m3 m1
w1 w2 w3 m1 m2 m3
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
6Setting jSj ￿ 2 and jTj ￿ 2 in the above de￿nition of weak stability, we obtain the original concept
of weak stability introduced by Klijn and Mass￿ (2003). Both de￿nitions are equivalent in one-to-one


















It can be shown that ￿ is a weakly stable matching but ￿ is not weakly e¢ cient since
￿0(i) ￿i ￿(i) for all i 2 N. Thus, ￿ does not belong to the bargaining set. The bargaining
set is equal to f￿0;￿00g which is also the set of corewise stable matchings.￿
3 Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability
The indirect dominance relation was ￿rst introduced by Harsanyi (1974) but was later
formalized by Chwe (1994). It captures the idea that coalitions of agents can anticipate
the actions of other coalitions. In other words, the indirect dominance relation captures the
fact that farsighted coalitions consider the end matching that their matching(s) may lead
to. A matching ￿0 indirectly dominates ￿ if ￿0 can replace ￿ in a sequence of matchings,
such that at each matching along the sequence all deviators are strictly better o⁄ at the
end matching ￿0 compared to the status-quo they face. Formally, indirect dominance is
de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 4 A matching ￿ is indirectly dominated by ￿0, or ￿ ￿ ￿0, if there exists
a sequence of matchings ￿0;￿1;:::;￿K (where ￿0 = ￿ and ￿K = ￿0) and a sequence of
coalitions S0;S1;:::;SK￿1 such that for any k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g,
(i) ￿K ￿ ￿k￿1 8i 2 Sk￿1, and
(ii) coalition Sk￿1 can enforce the matching ￿k over ￿k￿1.
De￿nition 4 gives us the de￿nition of indirect dominance. The indirect dominance
relation is denoted by ￿. Direct dominance is obtained by setting K = 1 in De￿nition 4.
Obviously, if ￿ < ￿0, then ￿ ￿ ￿0.
Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) have investigated farsighted stability in hedonic games
(of which one-to-one matching problems are a special case) introducing the notion of
the coalitional largest farsighted conservative stable set which coincides with the largest
consistent set due to Chwe (1994).7
7The largest consistent set exists, is non-empty, and satis￿es external stability (i.e. any matching
outside the set is indirectly dominated by some matching belonging to the set). But a consistent set does
not necessarily satisfy the external stability condition. Only the largest consistent set is guaranteed to
satisfy external stability.
6De￿nition 5 Z(￿) ￿ M is a consistent set if ￿ 2 Z(￿) if and only if 8￿0, S such that
S can enforce ￿0 over ￿, 9￿00 2 Z(￿), where ￿0 = ￿00 or ￿0 ￿ ￿00, such that ￿(i) 6￿i ￿00(i)
8i 2 S. The largest consistent set ￿(￿) is the consistent set that contains any consistent
set.
Interestingly, Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) have proved that in hedonic games with
strict preferences (i) any partition belonging to the core indirectly dominates any other
partition, and (ii) core partitions are always contained in the largest consistent set. Thus,
in one-to-one matching markets, for all ￿0 6= ￿ with ￿ 2 C(<) we have that ￿ ￿ ￿0,
and C(<) ￿ ￿(￿). However, the largest consistent set may contain more matchings than
those matchings that are corewise stable as shown in Example 3.
Example 3 (Knuth, 1976) Let M = fm1;m2;m3;m4g and W = fw1;w2;w3;w4g. Let
P be such that:
P(m1) P(m2) P(m3) P(m4) P(w1) P(w2) P(w3) P(w4)
w1 w2 w3 w4 m4 m3 m2 m1
w2 w1 w4 w3 m3 m4 m1 m2
w3 w4 w1 w2 m2 m1 m4 m3
w4 w3 w2 w1 m1 m2 m3 m4




m1 m2 m3 m4




m1 m2 m3 m4
w4 w2 w3 w1
!
.
There are ten corewise stable matchings where men (m1;m2;m3;m4) are matched to
women (w1;w2;w3;w4), (w2;w1;w3;w4), (w1;w2;w4;w3), (w2;w1;w4;w3), (w2;w4;w1;w3),
(w3;w1;w4;w2), (w3;w4;w1;w2), (w3;w4;w2;w1), (w4;w3;w1;w2), and (w4;w3;w2;w1),
respectively. It can be shown that ￿0 and ￿00 belong to the bargaining set (see Klijn and
Mass￿, 2003) but none of them is a corewise stable matching. We already know that if
￿ 2 C(<) then ￿ 2 ￿(￿). We will show that ￿0 and ￿00 belong to the largest consistent
set, ￿(￿). We know that if ￿ 2 C(<) then for all b ￿ 6= ￿ we have that ￿ ￿ b ￿. Moreover,
we have that (i) for each i 2 N there is ￿ 2 C(<) such that ￿(i) = ￿0(i), and (ii) for
each i 2 N there is ￿ 2 C(<) such that ￿(i) = ￿00(i). Hence, for all ￿000, S such that
S can enforce ￿000 over ￿0, 9￿ 2 C(<) ￿ ￿(￿), where ￿000 ￿ ￿, such that ￿0(i) 6￿i ￿(i)
8i 2 S. Thus, ￿0 2 ￿(￿). Similarly, for all ￿000, S such that S can enforce ￿000 over ￿00,
9￿ 2 C(<) ￿ ￿(￿), where ￿000 ￿ ￿, such that ￿00(i) 6￿i ￿(i) 8i 2 S; and, ￿00 2 ￿(￿).
So, the largest consistent set may contain more matchings than those matchings that are
corewise stable.￿
7Now we give the de￿nition of a vNM farsightedly stable set due to Chwe (1994).
De￿nition 6 A set of matchings V ￿ M is a vNM farsightedly stable set with respect to
P if
(i) For all ￿ 2 V , there does not exist ￿0 2 V such that ￿0 ￿ ￿;
(ii) For all ￿0 = 2 V there exists ￿ 2 V such that ￿ ￿ ￿0:
De￿nition 6 gives us the de￿nition of a vNM farsightedly stable set V (￿). Let V(￿) be
the set of all vNM farsightedly stable sets. Part (i) in De￿nition 6 is the internal stability
condition: no matching inside the set is indirectly dominated by a matching belonging
to the set. Part (ii) is the external stability condition: any matching outside the set is
indirectly dominated by some matching belonging to the set. Chwe (1994) has shown that
the largest consistent set always contains the vNM farsightedly stable sets. That is, if
V (￿) is a vNM farsightedly stable set, then V (￿) ￿ ￿(￿).
We next reconsider the above examples to show that non corewise stable matchings,
that belong either to the vNM stable set or to the set of weakly stable matchings or to the
largest consistent set, do not survive the stability requirements imposed by introducing
farsightedness into the concept of vNM stable sets.
Example 1 (continue) Remember that C(<) = f￿0g is the set of corewise stable match-
ings and V (<) = f￿;￿0;￿00g is the unique vNM stable set. It is easy to verify that ￿0 ￿ ￿
and ￿0 ￿ ￿00. Let ￿0 = ￿, ￿1 = ? (all agents are single), ￿2 = ￿0, S0 = fw1;w2;w3g, and
S1 = N. We have (i) ￿2 ￿ ￿0 8i 2 S0 and S0 can enforce ￿1 over ￿0, (ii) ￿2 ￿ ￿1 8i 2 S1
and S1 can enforce ￿2 over ￿1. Thus, ￿2 ￿ ￿0 or ￿0 ￿ ￿. Similarly, it is easy to verify
that ￿0 ￿ ￿00. Hence, f￿;￿0;￿00g cannot be a vNM farsightedly stable set, nor can f￿;￿0g
or f￿0;￿00g be a vNM farsightedly stable set since internal stability is violated. Moreover,
￿ does not indirectly dominates ￿0 and ￿00 does not indirectly dominates ￿0. It implies
that the sets f￿;￿00g, f￿g or f￿00g cannot be vNM farsightedly stable sets as they violate
the external stability condition. In fact, V (￿) = f￿0g is the unique vNM farsightedly
stable set.￿
Example 2 (continue) Remember that ￿ is weakly stable. We will show that ￿ cannot
belong to any vNM farsightedly stable sets. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose that
￿ belong to some V (￿). Since ￿ 6￿ ￿0 and ￿ 6￿ ￿00, ￿ has to be with ￿0 and ￿00 in
V (￿) in order to satisfy the external stability condition. But, since ￿0 ￿ ￿ and ￿00 ￿ ￿,
f￿;￿0;￿00g ￿ V (￿) would violate internal stability. Hence, ￿ = 2 V (￿). In fact, the vNM
8farsightedly stable sets are f￿0g and f￿00g. That is, V(￿) = ff￿0g;f￿00gg.￿
Example 3 (continue) Remember that ￿0 and ￿00 belong to the largest consistent set but
are not corewise stable. First, we show that f￿0g cannot be a vNM farsightedly stable
set since the external stability condition would be violated. Indeed, for instance, ￿0 does
not indirectly dominate the matching where men (m1;m2;m3;m4) are matched to women
(w2;w1;w3;w4). Second, we show that a set composed of ￿0 and other matching(s) cannot
be a vNM farsightedly stable set since the internal stability condition would be violated.
Indeed, (i) ￿ ￿ ￿0 if ￿ 2 C(<); (ii) ￿0 ￿ ￿00 and ￿0 ￿ ￿00; (iii) the matchings where men
(m1;m2;m3;m4) are matched to women (w1;w3;w4;w2), (w3;w1;w2;w4), (w1;w4;w2;w3),
(w1;w4;w3;w2), (w4;w1;w2;w3), (w4;w1;w3;w2), (w2;w3;w1;w4), (w2;w3;w4;w1), (w3;w2,
w1;w4), (w3;w2;w4;w1), (w2;w4;w3;w1), and (w4;w2;w1;w3), respectively, indirectly dom-
inate ￿0, but ￿0 does not indirectly dominate any of these matchings. Thus, the largest
consistent set may contain more matchings than those matchings that belong to the vNM
farsightedly stable sets.￿
4 Main results
From De￿nition 6, we have that, for V (￿) to be a singleton vNM farsightedly stable set,
only external stability needs to be veri￿ed. That is, the set f￿g is a vNM farsightedly
stable set if and only if for all ￿0 6= ￿ we have that ￿ ￿ ￿0.
In order to show our main results we use Lemma 1 that shows that an individually
rational matching ￿ does not indirectly dominate another matching ￿0 if and only if there
exists a pair fi;￿0(i)g that blocks ￿. In other words, ￿ indirectly dominates ￿0 if and only
if there does not exist a pair fi;￿0(i)g that blocks ￿.
Lemma 1 Consider any two matchings ￿0;￿ 2 M such that ￿ is individually rational.
Then, ￿ 6￿ ￿0 if and only if there exists a pair fi;￿0(i)g such that both i and ￿0(i) prefer
￿0 to ￿.
Proof. Let B(￿0;￿) be the set of men and women who are strictly better o⁄ in ￿ than in
￿0. Accordingly, let I(￿0;￿) and W(￿0;￿) be the set of men and women who are indi⁄erent
between ￿ and ￿0 and worse o⁄ in ￿ than in ￿0, respectively.
()) For ￿ to indirectly dominate ￿0 it must be that i or ￿0(i) get divorced along the path
from ￿0 to ￿. But both i and ￿0(i) belong to W(￿0;￿), and then, they will never
divorce. Hence ￿ 6￿ ￿0.
9(() We will prove it by showing that ￿ ￿ ￿0 if the above condition is not satis￿ed.
Assume that for all pairs fi;￿0(i)g such that ￿0(i) 6= ￿(i), either i or ￿0(i) or both
belong to B(￿0;￿). Notice that every agent i single in ￿0 that accepts a match with
someone else in ￿ also belongs to B(￿0;￿) since ￿ is individually rational. Next con-
struct the following sequence of matchings from ￿0 to ￿: ￿0;￿1;￿2 (where ￿0 = ￿0,
￿1 = f￿1(i) = i, ￿1(￿0(i)) = ￿0(i) for all i 2 B(￿0;￿), and ￿1(j) = ￿0(j) otherwiseg,
and ￿2 = ￿), and the following sequence of coalitions S0;S1 with S0 = B(￿0;￿) and
S1 = B(￿0;￿) [ f￿(i) for i 2 B(￿0;￿)g. Then, coalition S0 can enforce ￿1 over ￿0
and coalition S1 can enforce ￿2 over ￿1. Moreover, ￿2 ￿ ￿0 for S0, and ￿2 ￿ ￿1
for S1 because every mate of i 2 B(￿0;￿) in ￿2 (in ￿) also prefers his or her mate
in ￿2 to being single in ￿1. Indeed, for every i 2 B(￿0;￿), either ￿2(i) 2 B(￿0;￿)
and hence both prefer ￿2 to ￿1, or ￿2(i) 2 W(￿0;￿). In this last case, ￿2(i) must
have lost his or her mate in ￿0 and ￿0(￿2(i)) must belong to B(￿0;￿) since otherwise
￿0(￿2(i)) and ￿2(i) would form a blocking pair of ￿2, and this by assumption is not
possible. Hence ￿2(i) must be single in ￿1. Then, since ￿2 is individually rational,
￿2(i) must prefer accepting his or her mate in ￿2 than remaining single at ￿1. So,
we have that ￿ ￿ ￿0.
Hence, if ￿ is individually rational and there does not exist a pair fi;￿0(i)g that blocks
￿, then ￿ ￿ ￿0.
Lemma 2 Consider any two matchings ￿0;￿ 2 M such that ￿0 is individually rational.
Then ￿ ￿ ￿0 implies that ￿ is also individually rational.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists i 2 N that prefers to be single than to be married
to ￿(i) in ￿. Since ￿ ￿ ￿0 and ￿0 is individually rational, we have that i was either single
at ￿0 or matched to ￿0(i) ￿i i. But then in the sequence of moves between ￿0 and ￿, the
￿rst time i has to move she/he was either matched with ￿0(i) or single and, hence, i cannot
belong to a coalition Sk￿1 that can enforce the matching ￿k over ￿k￿1 and such that all
members of Sk￿1 prefer ￿ to ￿k￿1, contradicting the fact that ￿ ￿ ￿0.
The next theorem shows that every corewise stable matching is a vNM farsightedly
stable set.
Theorem 1 If ￿ is a corewise stable matching, ￿ 2 C(<), then f￿g is a vNM farsightedly
stable set, f￿g = V (￿).
10Proof. We only need to verify condition (ii) in De￿nition 6: for all ￿0 6= ￿ we have that
￿ ￿ ￿0. Since ￿ 2 C(<), we know that 8￿0 6= ￿, @ i 2 M and j 2 W such that ￿0(i) = j
and ￿0 ￿ ￿ for both i and j. Since ￿ is individually rational, we have from Lemma 1 that
￿ ￿ ￿0.
We have just shown that if ￿ 2 C(<) then f￿g is a vNM farsightedly stable set.8 But,
a priori there may be other vNM farsightedly stable sets of matchings. We now show that
the only possible vNM farsightedly stable sets are singleton sets whose elements are the
corewise stable matchings.
Theorem 2 If V (￿) ￿ M is a vNM farsightedly stable set of matchings then V (￿) =
f￿g with ￿ 2 C(<).
Proof. Notice that if V (￿) ￿ C(<), then V (￿) is a vNM farsightedly stable set only
if V (￿) is a singleton set f￿g with ￿ 2 C(<). From Theorem 1, we know that for all
￿0 6= ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿0. Suppose now that V (￿)   C(<). Then, either V (￿) \ C(<) = ? or
V (￿) \ C(<) 6= ?.
Suppose ￿rst that V (￿)\C(<) 6= ?. Then, there exists a matching ￿ 2 V (￿)\C(<),
and we know that for all ￿0 6= ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿0 since f￿g is a vNM farsightedly stable set. But,
then there exists a matching ￿0 6= ￿ 2 V (￿) such that ￿ ￿ ￿0, violating the internal
stability condition.
Suppose now that V (￿) \ C(<) = ?. Then, we will show that V (￿) is not a vNM
farsightedly stable set because either the internal stability condition (condition (i) in
De￿nition 6) or the external stability condition (condition (ii) in De￿nition 6) is violated.
Assume V (￿) = f￿g is a singleton. Since ￿ = 2 C(<) there exists a deviating coalition
S in ￿ and a matching ￿0 2 M such that ￿0 ￿i ￿ for all i 2 S and S can enforce ￿0 over
￿. Then, ￿ 6￿ ￿0 and the external stability condition is violated.
Assume now that V (￿) contains more than one matching that do not belong to C(<).
Take any matching ￿1 2 V (￿). Since ￿1 = 2 C(<), there exists at least a pair of agents
fi;jg such that ￿1(j) 6= i (or a single agent fig) and a matching ￿0
1 2 M such that
￿0
1 ￿ ￿1 for both i and j (or ￿0
1 ￿ ￿1 for i), and fi;jg (or i) can enforce ￿0
1 over ￿1, i.e.
such that ￿0
1(j) = i (or ￿0
1(i) = i). Let S(￿1) be the set of blocking pairs of ￿1. Consider
the deviation from ￿1 to ￿0
1 of the subset of blocking pairs S0(￿1) ￿ S(￿1), where S0(￿1)
8Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) were ￿rst to show that in hedonic games (of which marriage problems
are a special case) with strict preferences, any partition belonging to the core indirectly dominates any
other partition. Here, we provide an alternative proof of their result for one-to-one matching problems
with strict preferences, and in Section 5 we show that this result also holds for many-to-one matching
problems with responsive preferences.
11contains the maximum number of blocking pairs and is such that the subset S(￿1)￿S0(￿1)
does not contain any blocking pair of ￿0
1. In order for V (￿) being a vNM farsightedly
stable set we need that the following conditions are satis￿ed:
(i) for any other matching ￿2 2 V (￿), ￿2 6= ￿1, it should be that ￿1 6￿ ￿2 and
￿2 6￿ ￿1
(ii) for all ￿0 = 2 V (￿) there exists ￿ 2 V (￿) such that ￿ ￿ ￿0 (in particular, we need
that there exists a matching ￿2 2 V (￿) such that ￿2 ￿ ￿0
1 for each matching, like ￿0
1,
that can be enforced by any subset of blocking pairs of any matching in V (￿)).
We will show that V (￿) is not a vNM farsightedly stable set because one of the above
conditions is not satis￿ed. Three di⁄erent cases should be considered.
1. Assume that S0(￿1) contains a blocking pair fig that divorces from ￿1(i). Consider
the deviation of fig from ￿1 to ￿00
1 where he or she divorces from ￿1(i), while the
other blocking pairs do not move. Then if ￿2 ￿ ￿00
1 (in order for V (￿) satisfying
external stability), we also have that ￿2 ￿ ￿1 since i will never marry someone else
and becoming worse o⁄ than being single. Hence, the internal stability condition is
violated and V (￿) is not a vNM farsightedly stable set. So V (￿) cannot contain
non-individually rational matchings.
2. Assume that S0(￿1) contains at least a blocking pair fi;jg that are single at ￿1 but
married at ￿0
1, i.e., ￿0
1(i) = j. Consider the deviation of fi;jg from ￿1 to ￿00
1 where
they get married, while the other blocking pairs do not move. Then if ￿2 ￿ ￿00
1 (in
order for V (￿) satisfying external stability), we will show that the internal stability
condition is violated. Two sub-cases have to be considered.
2.1. If i and j are still married in ￿2 (or they are married to someone else preferred
to j and i respectively), then ￿2 ￿ ￿1 and the internal stability condition is
violated.
2.2. On the contrary, assume that one of them, i, has divorced from j (leaving j
single in ￿2 like she was in ￿1) to marry to another woman ￿2(i) preferred to
j. But notice that the position (matching) of any other agent di⁄erent than i
and j in ￿00
1 is the same than in ￿1, since only i and j married at ￿00
1 while they
were single at ￿1, and then since ￿2 ￿ ￿00
1, we should have that fi;￿2(i)g 2
S(￿1). But then, the pair fi;jg cannot belong to S0(￿1), since j is not the best
partner for i. Thus, consider the deviation of fi;￿2(i)g from ￿1 to ￿000
1 where
they get married, while the other blocking pairs do not move. Then, if we have
that ￿2 ￿ ￿000
1 (in order for V (￿) satisfying external stability), we also have
￿2 ￿ ￿1 and the internal stability condition is violated.
123. Assume that all blocking pairs fi;jg 2 S0(￿1) are such that at least one of the
blocking partners (or both of them) is married at ￿1 with someone else, ￿1(j) 6= i;j
and now at ￿0
1 they get married ￿0
1(j) = i. Assume that in the deviation from ￿1 to
￿0
1 all blocking pairs in S0(￿1) get married so that at ￿0
1 no other blocking pair exists
(S(￿1)￿S0(￿1) does not contain any blocking pair of ￿0
1). Three sub-cases have to
be considered.
3.1. If at ￿2 we have that every blocking pair fi;jg 2 S0(￿1) is such that i and j
are still married or they are married to someone else but preferred to j and to
i, respectively, then ￿2 ￿ ￿1 and the internal stability condition is violated.
3.2. Assume that at ￿2 no initial blocking pair fi;jg 2 S0(￿1) is still married, and
that in each blocking pair fi;jg 2 S0(￿1) we have that i is marrying ￿2(i) 6= j
divorcing from j. Hence, in order to have that ￿2 ￿ ￿0
1 but ￿2 6￿ ￿1 and given
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we need that there does not exist a pair fk;￿0
1(k)g
married at ￿0
1 (or a single agent k) that blocks ￿2, and that there exists a
pair fk;￿1(k)g married at ￿1 (or a single agent k) that blocks ￿2, with ￿2
individually rational. Notice that the only change between ￿1 and ￿0
1 is that
each blocking pair fi;jg 2 S0(￿1) gets married leaving ￿1(j) (and possibly
￿1(i)) single. Then we will prove that whenever ￿2 ￿ ￿0
1 but ￿2 6￿ ￿1, we have
that ￿1 ￿ ￿2, violating the internal stability condition. By Lemma 1, we only
need to show that there does not exist a pair fk;￿2(k)g married at ￿2 (or a
single agent k) that blocks ￿1.
Since ￿2 ￿ ￿0
1 but ￿2 6￿ ￿1, we have that, for each pair fi;jg 2 S0(￿1),
whenever i is better o⁄ at ￿2 than at ￿0
1 (and then better than at ￿1), ￿2(i)
is worse o⁄ at ￿2 than at ￿0
1, because no other blocking pair di⁄erent from the
ones contained in S0(￿1) exists at ￿0
1 (and hence ￿2(i) is worse o⁄ at ￿2 than
at ￿1), and some pair f￿1(j);jg married at ￿1 (with j such that ￿0
1(j) = i, and
fi;jg 2 S0(￿1)) prefers ￿1 to ￿2 and is a blocking pair of ￿2 making ￿2 6￿ ￿1.
Thus, whenever ￿1(j) and j are either single or married to someone else at ￿2
they both would prefer ￿1 to ￿2. Also all the remaining initial partners ￿1(i)
(and ￿1(j)) that have been left by i (and by j) with fi;jg 2 S0(￿1), when single
at ￿2, prefer ￿1 to ￿2 because otherwise ￿1 would not be individually rational.
Whenever some initial blocking partner ￿1(i) (and ￿1(j)) is not single at ￿2
but married to someone else ￿2(￿1(i)) (married to ￿2(￿1(j))), either ￿1(i) or
￿2(￿1(i)) (either ￿1(j) or ￿2(￿1(j))) or both should prefer ￿1 to ￿2 because
otherwise the pair f￿1(i);￿2(￿1(i))g (the pair f￿1(j);￿2(￿1(j))g) would have
been also a blocking pair at ￿0
1. So, we have shown that every pair of agents
13matched (every single agent at ￿2) at ￿2 and not matched (not single) at ￿1
that contains one of the initial deviating players in S0(￿1) or one of the players
initially matched at ￿1 to some i 2 S0(￿1) is such that one of the mates prefers
￿2 to ￿1 while the other prefers ￿1 to ￿2.
Since ￿2 ￿ ￿0
1 we have, by Lemma 1, that there is no blocking pair of ￿2 at
￿0
1, and then, every pair of agents fk;lg such that ￿2(l) = k and ￿0
1(l) 6= k with
￿0
1(k) = ￿1(k) and ￿0
1(l) = ￿1(l), is such that if one of the mates prefers ￿2 to
￿0
1 (and hence, prefers ￿2 to ￿1) then the other prefers ￿0
1 to ￿2 (and hence,
prefers ￿1 to ￿2), and all single agents k at ￿2 that are married at ￿0
1, with
￿0
1(k) = ￿1(k), prefer ￿0
1 to ￿2 (and hence, prefer ￿1 to ￿2). Moreover, since
the pairs fi;jg 2 S0(￿1) are the only blocking pairs at ￿1, every pair of agents
fk;lg such that ￿2(l) = k and ￿0
1(k) 6= l with fk;lg 2 S(￿1)￿S0(￿1), is such
that if one of the mates prefers ￿2 to ￿1 then the other prefers ￿1 to ￿2 because
otherwise they would have been a blocking pair at ￿1, and all single agents at
￿2 that belong to S(￿1)￿S0(￿1), that are married at ￿0
1 (and hence, are married
at ￿1) prefer ￿0
1 to ￿2 (and hence, prefer ￿1 to ￿2) because otherwise ￿0
1 (and
hence, ￿1) would not be individually rational.
Thus, we have proved that when ￿2 ￿ ￿0
1 but ￿2 6￿ ￿1, we have that there is
a pair f￿1(j);jg (with j such that ￿0
1(j) = i, and fi;jg 2 S0(￿1)) that prefers
￿1 to ￿2 and that every other pair of agents matched at ￿2 and not matched at
￿1 is such that one of the mates prefers ￿2 to ￿1 while the other prefers ￿1 to
￿2. So, there does not exist a pair fi;￿2(i)g matched at ￿2 that blocks ￿1, and
then by Lemma 1 we have ￿1 ￿ ￿2, violating the internal stability condition.
3.3. Finally, consider the case in which ￿2 contains some but not all initial blocking
pairs from ￿1 contained in S0(￿1). Then, consider the deviation from ￿1 to ￿00
1
such that ￿00
1 ￿ ￿1 by all the initial blocking pairs belonging to S00(￿1)   S0(￿1)
that are still married at ￿2 and that can be enforced by such blocking pairs
from ￿1. Since ￿2 ￿ ￿00
1 (in order for V (￿) satisfying external stability), we
will have that ￿2 ￿ ￿1 violating the internal stability condition.
5 Many-to-one matching problems
A many-to-one matching problem consists of a set of N agents divided into a set of
hospitals, H = fh1;:::;hrg, and a set of medical students, S = fs1;:::;ssg, where possibly
r 6= s. For each hospital h 2 H there is a positive integer qh called the quota of hospital
14h, which indicates the maximum number of positions to be ￿lled. Let Q = fqhgh2H. Each
hospital h 2 H has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation over the set of
medical students S and the prospect of having its position un￿lled, denoted h. Hospital
h￿ s preferences can be represented by a strict ordering of the elements in S [ fhg; for
instance, P(h) = s1;s2;h;s3;::: denotes that hospital h prefers to enroll s1 rather than
s2, that it prefers to enroll either one of them rather than leave a position un￿lled, and
that all other medical students are unacceptable. Each medical student s 2 S has a
strict, transitive, and complete preference relation over the hospitals H and the prospect
of being unemployed. Student s￿ s preferences can be represented by a strict ordering
of the elements in H [ fsg; for instance, P(s) = h2;h1;h3;s;::: denotes that the only
positions the student would accept are those o⁄ered by h2, h1, and h3, in that order. Let
P = (fP(h)gh2H;fP(s)gs2S). A many-to-one matching market is simply (H;S;P;Q).
De￿nition 7 A matching ￿ is a mapping from the set H [S into the set of all subsets of
H [ S such that for all s 2 S and h 2 H :
(a) Either j￿(s)j = 1 and ￿(s) ￿ H or else ￿(s) = s.
(b) ￿(h) 2 2S and j￿(h)j ￿ qh.
(c) ￿(s) = fhg if and only if s 2 ￿(h).
We denote by P￿(h) the preference relation of hospital h over sets of students. We
assume that P￿(h) is responsive to P(h). That is, whenever ￿0(h) = ￿(h) [ fsg n fs0g
for s0 2 ￿(h) and s = 2 ￿(h), then h prefers ￿0(h) to ￿(h) (under P￿(h)) if and only if h
prefers s to s0 (under P(h)). Under this condition, as in Roth and Sotomayor (1990),
we can associate to the many-to-one matching problem a one-to-one matching problem
in which we replace hospital h by qh positions of h denoted by h1;h2;:::;hqh. Each of
these positions has preferences over individuals that are identical with those of h. Each
student￿ s preference list is modi￿ed by replacing h, wherever it appears on his or her list,
by the string h1;h2;:::;hqh in that order. That is, if s prefers h1 to h2, then s prefers all
positions of h1 to all positions of h2, and s prefers h1
1, to all the other positions of h1.
In many-to-one matching problems, it makes sense to distinguish between setwise en-
forceability and corewise enforceability.9
De￿nition 8 (setwise enforceability) Given a matching ￿, a coalition S ￿ N is said
to be able to enforce a matching ￿0 over ￿ if the following condition holds: 8i 2 S, if
￿0(i) 6= ￿(i), then ￿0(i)n(￿0(i) \ ￿(i)) 2 S.
9Corewise enforceability has already been de￿ned in De￿nition 1. Obviously, setwise enforceability and
corewise enforceability are equivalent in one-to-one matching problems.
15Depending on the notion of enforceability used (setwise or corewise), we obtain the
setwise direct dominance relation (
s
<) or the corewise direct dominance relation (
c
<), the
set of setwise stable matchings (C(
s
<)) or the set of corewise stable matchings (C(
c
<)),
the vNM setwise stable sets (V (
s
<)) or the vNM corewise stable sets (V (
c
<)). A matching
￿ is setwise stable if there is no subset of agents who by forming new partnerships only
among themselves, possibly dissolving some partnerships of ￿, can all obtain a strictly
preferred set of partners. A matching of the many-to-one matching problem is setwise
stable if and only if the corresponding matchings of the associated one-to-one matching
problem is (setwise) stable (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). However, this result does not
hold for corewise stability.
In many-to-one matching problems with responsive preferences, the indirect dominance
relation is invariant to the notion of enforceability in use. Indeed, if ￿ is indirectly domi-
nated by ￿0 under corewise enforceability, it is obvious that ￿ is indirectly dominated by
￿0 under setwise enforceability. In the other direction, if ￿ is indirectly dominated by ￿0
under setwise enforceability, then ￿ is indirectly dominated by ￿0 under corewise enforce-
ability because if for some i 2 S we have that ￿0(i) \ ￿(i) 6= ?, then i could ￿rst become
"single" and then match with ￿0(i), instead of matching directly with ￿0(i)n(￿0(i) \ ￿(i)).
Lemma 3 A matching ￿ is indirectly dominated by ￿0 in a many-to-one matching problem
if and only if ￿ is indirectly dominated by ￿0 in the associated one-to-one matching problem.
Proof. If ￿ is indirectly dominated by ￿0 in the associated one-to-one matching problem,
then there exists a sequence of matchings ￿0;￿1;:::;￿K (where ￿0 = ￿ and ￿K = ￿0) and a
sequence of coalitions S0;S1;:::;SK￿1 consisting only of individual students or hospitals, or
of student-hospital pairs and such that for any k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g, ￿K ￿ ￿k￿1 8i 2 Sk￿1,
and coalition Sk￿1 can enforce the matching ￿k over ￿k￿1. But then, ￿ is indirectly
dominated by ￿0 in the many-to-one matching problem by the deviations of the sequence
of coalitions consisting of the same singletons or pairs.
In the other direction, if ￿ is indirectly dominated by ￿0 in the many-to-one matching
problem by the deviations of a sequence of coalitions S0;S1;:::;SK￿1, then the fact that
￿K(i) ￿ ￿k￿1(i) 8i 2 Sk￿1 implies that, if i is a hospital h, then there exists a student s in
￿K(h) n ￿k￿1(h) and a ￿ in ￿k￿1(h) n ￿K(h) such that s ￿h ￿. (Otherwise, ￿ ￿h s for all
￿ in ￿k￿1(h) n ￿K(h) and s in ￿K(h) n ￿k￿1(h), and this would imply ￿k￿1(h) ￿h ￿K(h),
by repeated application of the fact that preferences are responsive and transitive.) So
s is in Sk￿1 and s prefers h = ￿K(s) to ￿k￿1(s). Thus, the coalition b Sk￿1 formed by
the pair fh;sg would deviate from ￿k￿1 in order to end at ￿K. Then, if the coalition
b Sk￿1 = fh;sg does not coincide with Sk￿1 (i.e. with the deviating coalition from ￿k￿1 to
￿k that likes to end at ￿K), once the pair fh;sg has moved from ￿k￿1 to b ￿k￿1, then the
16fact that ￿K(i) ￿ b ￿k￿1(i) 8i 2 Sk￿1n b Sk￿1 implies that, if i is a hospital h0, then there
exists a student s0 in ￿K(h0) n b ￿k￿1(h0) and a ￿0 in b ￿k￿1(h0) n ￿K(h0) such that s0 ￿h0 ￿0.
So s0 is in Sk￿1n b Sk￿1 and s0 prefers h0 = ￿K(s0) to b ￿k￿1(s0). Thus, the coalition e Sk￿1
formed by the pair fh0;s0g would deviate from b ￿k￿1 in order to end at ￿K. And so on until
every deviating pair contained in Sk￿1 has moved and we are in ￿k. So, every coalitional
deviation from ￿k￿1 to ￿k in the sequence of deviations from ￿ to ￿0 could be replaced
by a sequence of deviations of the deviating pairs contained in Sk￿1, and ￿ is indirectly
dominated by ￿0 in the corresponding one-to-one matching problem.
From Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, using Lemma 3, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 In a many-to-one matching problem with responsive preferences, a set of
matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its
element is a setwise stable matching.
Thus, our characterization of the vNM farsightedly stable set for one-to-one matching
problems extends to many-to-one matching problems with responsive preferences. This
result contrasts with Ehlers (2007) who has shown that there need not be any relationship
between the vNM corewise stable sets of a many-to-one matching problem and its associ-
ated one-to-one matching problem. Example 4 illustrates our main result for many-to-one
matching problems with responsive preferences: vNM farsightedly stable sets only con-
tain setwise stable matchings. Thus, if there is a matching of the many-to-one matching
problem that is corewise stable but not setwise stable, then this matching is never a vNM
farsightedly stable set.
Example 4 (Ehlers, 2005) Consider a many-to-one matching problem and its associ-
ated one-to-one matching problem with H = fh1;h2g, S = fs1;s2;s3;s4g, qh1 = 2, qh2 = 1,
and P such that:
P(h1
1) P(h2
1) P(h2) P(s1) P(s2) P(s3) P(s4)
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Ehlers (2005) has shown that V (
c
<) = f￿;￿0;e ￿;e ￿0;e ￿00g in this many-to-one matching prob-
lem, while V (
c
<) = f￿;￿0g in its associated one-to-one matching problem. Notice that
V (
s
<) = f￿;￿0g in both the many-to-one matching problem and its associated one-to-
one matching problem. The set of setwise stable matchings is C(
s
<) = f￿g. However,
￿0 2 C(
c
<) in the many-to-one matching problem, since ￿0 is not directly dominated via
any coalition (for instance, the coalition fh1;s2g that prefers b ￿ to ￿0 cannot enforce b ￿
over ￿0, and the members of the coalition fh1;s1;s2g that can enforce b ￿ over ￿0 do not
all prefer b ￿ to ￿0). Now, applying our results we have that V (￿) = f￿g in both the
many-to-one matching problem and its associated one-to-one matching problem. Contrary
to the direct dominance relation, ￿ indirectly dominates ￿0. Indeed, the sequence of devia-
tions is as follows. First, s2 leaves hospital h2; second, hospital h2 hires student s1; third,
hospital h1 = fh1
1;h2
1g hires student s2 (either directly when using setwise enforceability,
or ￿rst leaving student s3 and then hiring both students s2 and s3 when using corewise
enforceability).￿
6 Conclusion
We have characterized the vNM farsightedly stable sets in one-to-one matching problems:
a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and
its element is a corewise (hence, setwise) stable matching. Thus, we have provided an
alternative characterization of the core in one-to-one matching problems. Finally, we have
shown that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with responsive
preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a sin-
gleton set and its element is a setwise stable matching.
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